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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2023 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TERRY L. SEMPF, 
                             Appellant  
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania                                                          
W.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cr-00123-001 
District Judge: The Honorable David S. Cercone 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 19, 2016 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 20, 2016)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Terry Sempf, a former letter carrier with the United States Postal Service, 
was found guilty of conspiracy to transport stolen property, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and of interstate transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 
U.S.C § 2314.  He now appeals his convictions and claims that there were three 
errors below.  First, he argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the recordings of several conversations between him and the 
Government’s cooperating informant.  Second, he asserts that it was error for the 
District Court not to instruct the jury on the specific list of overt acts mentioned in 
the indictment.  Third, he claims that the District Court should not have given the 
jury a willful blindness instruction as there was no evidence to support it.  After 
considering all three of Sempf’s claims, we hold that none have merit and therefore 
will affirm his judgment and sentence. 
I. 
 Sempf, in addition to working as a letter carrier, sold products at a flea 
market in Rogers, Ohio for several years.  This side job led to trouble when Sempf 
started selling stolen goods that he obtained from several individuals at deep 
3 
 
discounts.1  One such individual was Tracey Orrico.  Orrico was at the time 
addicted to crack cocaine and shoplifted to support her drug addiction.  After 
stealing certain retail products, Orrico would contact Sempf and set up a time to 
meet and sell him the products.  As time passed, Sempf and Orrico began to work 
together more closely.  Sempf even helped Orrico buy a car to facilitate her 
shoplifting, making payments on Orrico’s behalf directly to the car dealership. 
 Orrico was eventually caught shoplifting and agreed to cooperate with law 
enforcement, claiming that she worked with Sempf and that he told her what to 
steal.  To investigate this story, the police, in cooperation with the FBI, set up 
several sting transactions in which they arranged for Orrico to meet with and sell 
approximately $5,000 worth of goods to Sempf.  The Government then bought 
several of these items back from Sempf’s flea market booth on two separate 
occasions.  In addition to the undercover sales, law enforcement officers, with 
Orrico’s consent, recorded several telephone calls and in-person conversations 
between Sempf and Orrico. 
 After gathering this evidence, the police executed a search warrant on 
                                                 
1 Because the facts are reviewed here to determine whether the District Court 
properly denied Sempf’s motion to suppress, we construe the record in the light 
most favorable to the Government.  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
 
 
 
4 
 
Sempf’s home.  This led to the recovery and removal of more products from the 
sting operation as well as additional stolen property, some of which still had 
security tags attached. 
II. 
 Sempf first challenges the District Court’s determination that Orrico 
voluntarily consented to the telephone and in-person recordings of her 
conversations with Sempf.  As we noted in United States v. Antoon, federal law 
requires the consent of at least one party to the conversation before it can be 
electronically recorded.  933 F.2d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 1991).  Consent, as we said in 
Antoon, “is a question of fact determined from the totality of the circumstances.”  
Id.  Thus, “[t]he ultimate test of voluntariness is whether, under the circumstances, 
the consent was an exercise of free will or whether the actor’s free will ‘has been 
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’”  Id. 
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).  We further 
clarified that “[c]onsent to a wiretap is not voluntary where it is coerced, either by 
explicit or implicit means or by implied threat or covert force.”  Id. at 203-04 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  That said, we also held in Antoon 
that our review of the District Court’s determination is for clear error.  Id. at 204.  
Thus, the District Court’s finding that consent was voluntary will not be overturned 
unless it is “(1) completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying 
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some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive 
evidentiary data.”  Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972)). 
 On the record before us, we cannot conclude that the District Court 
committed clear error.  Orrico signed a written consent form stating that her 
consent was voluntary, and she verbally consented before each recording.  While 
Orrico was motivated by a desire to avoid going to jail, her own self-interest does 
not undermine the voluntariness of her consent.  “An individual’s decision to allow 
the police to record a phone conversation . . . is not necessarily involuntary just 
because that individual’s motives were self-seeking, or because [s]he harbored 
expectations of personal benefit.”  United States v. Kelly, 708 F.2d 121, 125 (3d 
Cir. 1983).  The circumstances surrounding Orrico’s consent also do not suggest 
that she was coerced into consenting.  She was not in custody at the time the forms 
were signed and she was not asked to consent to the recordings until approximately 
two months after her arrest.  Orrico also did not express any hesitation when 
agreeing to the recordings.  All this suggests the recordings were conducted after 
proper consent was obtained. 
III. 
 Sempf next claims that it was plain error for the District Court not to tell the 
jury which specific overt acts were listed in the indictment.  While Sempf admits 
6 
 
that the District Court did properly instruct the jurors that they must unanimously 
agree on a particular overt act, he claims that the District Court “failed to 
enumerate the overt acts as set forth in the indictment,” and “[a]s such, the jury 
could not possibly have unanimously agreed on the same overt act, as they were 
never told what the overt acts alleged in the indictment were.”  However, as we 
stated in United States v. Schurr, 794 F.2d 903, 907 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986), “[i]t is well 
settled that the government can prove overt acts not listed in the indictment.”  
Thus, because the jury was told that it had to unanimously agree on the 
commission of at least one overt act, there was no plain error.  See United States v. 
Adamo, 534 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir. 1976) (“There is general agreement that the 
Government is not limited in its proof at trial to those overt acts alleged in the 
indictment.”). 
IV. 
 Finally, Sempf argues that it was error for the District Court to give a willful 
blindness instruction, as the Government’s theory throughout the trial was that 
Sempf had actual knowledge and intentionally directed Orrico and other suppliers 
to steal certain products.  Sempf claims, therefore, that “[t]here was no room in this 
case for a willful blindness instruction in that a willful blindness theory was 
completely inconsistent with the factual theory presented from opening to closing 
by the government.”  This same argument was rejected in United States v. Wert-
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Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2000).  There, the defendant argued that the 
government only adduced evidence of her actual knowledge of the conspiracy, and 
that the willful blindness instruction was inconsistent with the government’s theory 
of the case.  Id.  We disagreed, explaining that even if evidence was introduced 
only to support the claim the defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal 
conspiracy, we were also “mindful that the jury was entitled to decide that only 
part of the government’s evidence was credible.”  Id. at 256.  Accordingly, we held 
that introducing evidence suggesting actual knowledge was not “inconsistent with 
the conduct of an individual who willfully blinded herself from the source of the 
funds with which she dealt and the nature of those activities.”  Id. 
 The same is true here.  While the Government’s theory was that Sempf knew 
what Orrico was doing and thus that the products were stolen, this is not 
inconsistent with a theory of willful blindness, as the jury was entitled to disbelieve 
any portion of the Government’s case.  Thus, for example, the jury could have 
concluded that Sempf deliberately avoided learning the truth about how Orrico was 
obtaining the products at such a deep discount.  Indeed, Sempf claimed that he 
believed Orrico had obtained the products as a result of extreme couponing.  To 
conclude that the Government’s evidence could support only “actual knowledge 
that the merchandise was stolen or . . . no knowledge at all” would ignore the fact 
that the jury is free to reassess the evidence and make its own credibility 
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determinations. 
V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment and sentence 
imposed by the District Court. 
 
 
